Management
- Key People:
- Wilhelm Groener
Both during and after World War II the United States operated the largest and most advanced logistic system in the world. Its wartime operations stressed speed, volume, and risk-taking more than efficiency and economy. The postwar years, with accelerated technological change, skyrocketing costs, and diminished public interest in defense, brought a revulsion against military prodigality, manifested by calls for reduced defense budgets and a growing demand for more efficient management of the military establishment. This demand culminated in a thorough overhaul of the whole system in the 1960s.
One result was the reorganization of logistic activities in the three military services, generally along functional lines, with large logistic commands operating under functional staff supervision. In each service, however, each major weapon system was centrally managed by a separate project officer, and central inventory control was maintained for large commodity groups. In 1961 a new defense supply agency was established to manage on a wholesale basis the procurement, storage, and distribution of common military supplies and the administration of certain common services.
The most far-reaching managerial reforms of the period were instituted by the U.S. defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara (1961–68), in the resource allocation process. A unified defense planning–programming–budgeting system provided for five-year projections of force, manpower, and dollar requirements for all defense activities, classified into eight or nine major programs (such as strategic forces) that cut across the lines of traditional service responsibilities. The system was introduced in other federal departments after 1965, and elements of it were adopted by the British and other governments. In 1966 a program was inaugurated to integrate management accounting at the operating level with the programming–budgeting system. At the end of the 1960s a new administration restored some of the initiative in the planning–budgeting–programming cycle to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services.
The reforms of the 1960s exploited the whole range of current managerial methodology. The basic techniques, such as systems and operations analysis, all stressed precise, scientific, usually quantitative formulations of problems and mathematical approaches to rational decision making. Systems analysis, the technique associated with defense planning and programming, was a method of economic and mathematical analysis useful in dealing with complex problems of choice under conditions of uncertainty. The technological foundation of this improved logistic management was the high-speed electronic computer, which was being used chiefly in inventory control; in automated operations at depots, bases, and stations; in transmitting and processing supply data; in personnel administration; and in command-and-control networks.
War in Vietnam
One of the most significant developments in logistics after 1945 was the pitting of advanced high-technology systems against well-organized low-technology systems operating on their own ground. The Korean War and the anticolonial wars in French Indochina and Algeria were the principal conflicts of this kind in the 1950s. The war in Vietnam following large-scale U.S. intervention in 1965 brought into conflict the most effective of both types of systems.
Because South Vietnam lacked most of the facilities on which modern military forces depend, the massive U.S. deployment that began in the spring of 1965, reaching 180,000 men by the end of that year and more than 550,000 in 1969, was accompanied, rather than preceded, by a huge ($4 billion) construction program, carried out partly by army, navy, and air force engineer units and partly by a consortium of engineering contractors. Under this program were built seven deepwater and several smaller ports, eight jet air bases with 10,000-foot (3,050-metre) runways, 200 smaller airfields, and 200 heliports, besides millions of square feet of covered and refrigerated storage, hundreds of miles of roads, hundreds of bridges, oil pipelines and tanks, and all the other apparatuses of a modern logistic infrastructure. Deep-draft shipping brought in all but scarce items of airlifted supplies and came mainly from the U.S. directly.
The soldier in the field received lavish logistic support. By means of helicopter supply, troops in contact with the enemy were often provided with hot meals; most of the wounded were promptly evacuated to hospitals and serious cases were moved by air to base facilities in the Pacific or the United States. Medical evacuation, combined with advances in medicine, helped to raise the ratio of surviving wounded to dead to 6:1, in contrast to a World War II ratio of 2.6:1. Logistic support of army forces was organized under a single logistic command having a strength of 30,000 and employing 50,000 Vietnamese, U.S., and foreign civilians. Ultimately there were four or five support personnel for every infantryman who bore the brunt of contact fighting with the enemy.
The communist logistic system centred in the highly mobilized society of North Vietnam. In its integration, efficiency, and resilience under concentrated and prolonged bombing it rivaled the war economy of Germany in World War II. Its resilience owed much, however, to its being a village-centred agricultural society, with modest material needs and a limited industrial base, which produced no steel, very little pig iron, and only one-fifth as much electric power as a single power plant in a small American town.
By late 1967 the communist war effort in South Vietnam depended heavily on the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies from North Vietnam, supplied mainly by the Soviet Union. The troops and most of the supplies moved over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, originally a network of footpaths and dirt roads (often paved after 1967) through communist-controlled areas in Laos and Cambodia. Supplies also came into South Vietnam by sea, directly across the northern border, and, especially after 1967, through the Cambodian port of Kompong Som and overland into the Mekong delta.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a long, slow-moving pipeline, requiring from three to six months in transit by truck, barge, ox cart, bicycle, and foot, but its capacity was ample for the modest demands placed upon it. In mid-1967, U.S. intelligence estimated the total nonfood requirements of all communist forces in South Vietnam, except in the northernmost provinces, to be as low as 15 tons (13,640 kilograms) per day (about 1.5 ounces, or 43 grams, per man); food was procured locally and in nearby Cambodia and Laos. In 1968, when the pace of the war quickened and communist forces were substantially augmented, estimated nonfood requirements rose to about 120 tons per day. (A single U.S. division required about five times this amount.)
American bombing had little effect on the flow of troops to the south, and the communist logistic system stood up remarkably well—and ultimately victoriously—under the weight of American air power. Its strength lay primarily in its austerity, but also in efficient organization, lavish use of manpower, availability of sanctuary areas in Laos and Cambodia, and a steady flow of imported supplies.
Afghanistan
The Soviet Union’s Afghan war (1979–89), though on a scale smaller than Vietnam, embodied similar political, social, and economic dynamics and a similar contest between high-technology and low-technology logistic systems. Soviet forces, concentrated in the principal cities and towns, relied heavily on airlift and convoyed motor transport to move troops and supplies. Afghan guerrillas (called mujahideen), holding most of the countryside, used mainly animal transport and brought much of their supplies and weapons across the border from Pakistan. In an agriculturally poor country, significantly depopulated by Soviet bombing and forced flight into Pakistan, mass hunger and disease were widespread. For most of the war an approximate stalemate prevailed, in logistics as well as in tactical operations. But in 1986 the acquisition from the United States and Great Britain of substantial numbers of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles enabled the mujahideen to challenge Soviet control of the air—a significant factor in the Soviets’ withdrawal early in 1989.
Trends and prospects
For logisticians the fundamental dilemma posed by the quantum leap in weapons technology after World War II was the absence of any comparable development in logistics. The electronic computer had, indeed, a dramatic impact on logistic planning and administration, as well as on military administration in general. The computer enabled planners to visualize problems concretely, often in quantitative terms; it accelerated the transmission of demand and the administrative response to it; and it enabled the military services for the first time to control their inventories. But the computer could not touch the ancient problem, compounded by the new weaponry, of actually providing and moving supplies to their users.
Conversely, nuclear weapons threatened to sweep away every vestige of the logistic system of the industrial era. None of the elaborate apparatuses of rear-area administration, lines of communication, or even sources of supply seemed likely to survive the nuclear firepower that could be brought to bear against it. The problem was studied and restudied, and a great deal of hopeful doctrine was developed for logistic operations in a nuclear war. It revolved about such concepts as dispersion, mobility, small targets, duplication, multiplicity, austerity, concealment, and automaticity, yet all of it was little more than a planner’s dream, and a fading dream at that. At best it promised to reduce somewhat the inherent vulnerability of the surface-bound installations and transport on which military forces for the foreseeable future were likely to depend. Dispersion and duplication were enemies of economy and efficiency. The net effect could only be to increase the costs of logistic support and diminish the yield of delivered supplies and services.
In any case, nuclear war seemed the least likely of prospects. The most likely appeared to be a continuation of the confused patterns of limited conventional war and quasi-war that had filled the decades since the end of World War II. Under these conditions the central problems of logistics would be the historic ones of weight and bulk, which inhibited mobility and range of movement and were the primary causes of vulnerability to the new firepower. The technologies of these decades had accelerated the basic logistic trends of the industrial era: increasing complexity and cost in military hardware, increasing overall weight and volume of material (despite a reverse trend toward reduced numbers in some major items, such as aircraft), and, above all, an enormous increase in expenditures of ammunition and fuel. Logisticians in the postwar decades had to face the probability that in another large-scale conventional conflict between advanced powers the new vehicles would consume about half again as much fuel and the new weapons would expend more than four times as much ammunition as had been consumed and expended in World War II.
Some of the new tools of logistics were highly effective in specialized environments, notably the growing family of helicopters used in conjunction with conventional and short-takeoff-and-landing air transports, which permitted a mobility and a range of movement over difficult terrain far beyond the capabilities of surface transport. Whether an airmobile logistic system could survive the firepower likely to be encountered in a conflict with an adversary disputing command of the air was a question to which experience had not yet given an answer. In any case, the system purchased its mobility and range at a fuel cost several times higher than that involved in surface transport.
How well the “sophisticated” systems, with their growing burden of weight and bulk, would function under a threat to their previously immune supply lines was perhaps the most serious challenge facing modern logisticians. Nuclear propulsion offered a theoretical solution, but there seemed little hope for its early application to large sectors of military movement. A nuclear-powered sea transport service was a reasonable prospect, though not an early one, and it would not suffice for a major overseas war. More fundamentally, fuel consumption on the sea lanes was not the crux of the problem, and nuclear propulsion offered no solution to the vulnerability of surface vessels to air and submarine attack. The massive fuel consumers were aircraft and ground vehicles, and serious technical obstacles barred the application of nuclear energy to their power plants.
The reckoning, if there was to be one, might be long postponed. Given the existing distribution and equilibriums of power among the advanced nations, on the one hand, and the high cost and slow diffusion of sophisticated military technology to the less-developed two-thirds of the world, on the other, limited warfare seemed likely for a long time to come to remain at relatively low technical levels. Meanwhile, sophisticated logistic systems were becoming more entangled in their own complexity and absorbed in the endless pursuit of efficient management and in the struggle to control the waste and friction involved in delivering the tools of war to their users.
Richard M. Leighton