Translation central-state theories

Among the philosophers who advocated the translation form was the American philosopher Herbert Feigl, earlier a member of the Vienna Circle, who, in an influential monograph, did the most to get contemporary philosophers to treat central-state materialism as a serious philosophical theory. Against the objection that, for example, “visual sensation” does not mean “process in the visual cortex,” advocates of the translation form pointed out that “the morning star” does not mean the same as “the evening star,” and yet the morning star as a matter of fact is the evening star (both terms refer to the planet Venus). The objection confuses meaning and reference. Against the objection that a purely physical process (a dance of electrons, protons, and so on) cannot have the sensory quality of greenness that is observed in a visual experience of seeing grass, say, they replied that to talk of the sensory experience of something looking green (or having a green mental image) is not to talk of anything that is literally green, but is simply to report that some internal process is of the sort that normally goes with seeing something, such as a lawn, which really is green. Though some immaterialists might say that the sort of process in question is “spiritual,” the materialist might equally claim that it is a material process in the brain. The analysis of the introspective report is neutral between these two contentions; the materialist, however, opts for his contention on various grounds. The British materialist U.T. Place did so on the ground of normal scientific methodology; and the Australian materialist J.J.C. Smart did so with a metaphysical application of the principle (called “Ockham’s razor”) that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. A physicalistic materialist has, of course, an obligation to go on to give a suitable account of such apparently nonphysicalist qualities as the greenness of grass. At one time Smart analyzed colours in terms of the discriminatory behaviour of human beings. Another Australian materialist, D.M. Armstrong, held, on the other hand, that colours are as a matter of fact properties of objects, such properties being of the sort describable in the theoretical terms of physics. Feigl, in turn, was to some extent (and rather reluctantly) a double-aspect theorist. He qualified the position taken by the other translation theorists, conceding that the translations do leave something out—viz., the immediately introspectable properties of “raw feels,” such as that of hearing the tone of middle C. He held, however, that such properties are irrelevant to causal explanations of phenomena.

1 of 2

2 of 2

The translation form of central-state materialism thus had some affinities with the earlier epistemic materialism of the logical positivist philosophers Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Thus, Carnap suggested that mental predicates be treated as applying to material entities: for example, “Carnap sees green” could be taken as meaning “the body Carnap is in the state of green-seeing,” the state of green-seeing being a purely physical state that explains the behavioral facts that led one to ascribe the predicate “sees green” to Carnap in the first place. David K. Lewis, an American philosopher of science and language, developed a translation form of central-state materialism on the basis of a theory regarding the definition of theoretical terms in science. According to this theory, entities such as electrons, protons, and neutrons are defined in terms of the causal roles that they play in relation to observational phenomena—e.g., phenomena in cloud chambers—but the method of definition is able to do justice to the causal and other interrelations between the theoretical entities themselves. Lewis applied this account to commonsense psychology. Since mental entities, such as pains, are defined in commonsense psychology in terms of their causal roles (in relation to observable behaviour) and since there is empirical reason to ascribe the same causal roles to brain processes, Lewis identified mental events, processes, and states with brain events, processes, and states.

Disappearance central-state theories

The disappearance form of central-state materialism was held by P.K. Feyerabend, an American philosopher, who denied that the materialist can give a neutral analysis of introspective reports. In Feyerabend’s view, commonsense introspective reports are irreducibly immaterialist in content. He argued, however, that this admission does not show the untenability of materialism. Ordinary mentalistic discourse, he held, is comparable to the medieval discourse about epileptics as being “possessed by the devil.” If one now “identified” demon possession with a certain medical condition of the brain, this would really be an assertion that there is no such thing as a demon-possessed state: the medieval way of looking at the matter is thus rejected. It is in this sort of way that Feyerabend wanted to “identify” the mind with the brain: he simply rejected the ordinary mentalistic conceptual scheme and so felt no obligation to show its compatibility with materialism.

The influential American philosophers W.V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars also held theories that could be regarded as disappearance forms of physicalistic materialism, though there is a Kantian twist to Sellars’s philosophy that makes it hard to classify. Sellars held that mentalistic concepts cannot be eliminated from the commonsense picture of the world, which he called “the manifest image.” In a way reminiscent of the German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, he held that, although the manifest image is inescapable, it does not give metaphysical truth about the world as it really is in itself. This truth is given, instead, by “the scientific image”—i.e., by theoretical science, which is physicalist. In the case of Quine, there is a certain Platonism in that he believes in the objective reality of some abstract, or nonspatiotemporal, entities—viz., those that are the subject matter of pure mathematics. Because he held that the reason for believing mathematics is that it is needed as part of physical theory, his reasons for believing in numbers and the like are not in principle different from those for believing in electrons; thus, Quine’s Platonism does not really compromise his physicalism.

The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was for part of his career professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, has sometimes been interpreted as a behaviourist, though his insistence that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” could possibly be interpreted as a sort of epistemic and central-state materialism. Nevertheless, to count Wittgenstein as a materialist would be to take considerable liberties with him; for, while displaying at times a certain mystical attitude, he also held very strongly that the business of a philosopher is not to put forward any metaphysical theory but to clear up conceptual confusions—as he put it, “to shew the fly out of the fly bottle.”