God is absolute insofar as he is eternal, cause, activity, creator; he is relative insofar as he is temporal, effect, passive (having potentiality in his nature), and affected by the world. For pantheism and classical theism, God is absolute; and for many forms of pantheism, the world, since it is identical with God, is likewise absolute. For classical theism, since it envisages a separation between God and the world, God is absolute and the world relative. For panentheism, however, God is absolute and relative, cause and effect, actual and potential, active and passive. The panentheist holds that, inasmuch as they refer to different levels of the divine nature, both sets of claims can be attributed to God without inconsistency, that just as a human being can have an absolute, unchanging purpose, which gains now one embodiment and now another, so God’s absoluteness can be an abstract unchanging feature of a changing totality.

The world as real or illusory

Panentheism, classical theism, and many forms of pantheism hold the world to be part of the ultimate reality. But for classical theism the world has a lesser degree of reality than God; and for some forms of pantheism, for which Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel coined the term acosmism, the world is unreal, an illusion, and God alone is real.

Freedom or determinism

In those forms of pantheism that envisage the eternal God literally encompassing the world, humanity is an utterly fated part of a world that is necessarily just as it is, and freedom is thus illusion. To be sure, classical theism holds to human freedom, but it insists that this freedom is compatible with a divine omniscience that includes his knowledge of the total future. Thus, the question arises whether or not such freedom is illusory. Panentheism, by insisting that future reality is indeterminate or open and that humanity and God, together, are in the process of determining what the future shall be, probably supports the doctrine of human freedom more completely than does any alternative point of view.

Sacramentalism or secularism

Insofar as God is the indwelling principle of the world and of each human being, as in pantheism, so far do these take on a sacramental character; and insofar as God is separated from the world as in 18th-century Deism, so far does it become secular, neutral, or even fallen. In contrast, classical theism, though basically sacramental, places this quality in an enclave, the church.

Hylozoistic pantheism

The divine is immanent in, and is typically regarded as the basic element of, the world, providing the motivating force for movement and change. The world remains a plurality of separate elements.

Immanentistic pantheism

God is a part of the world and immanent in it. Though only a part, however, his power extends throughout its totality.

Absolutistic monistic pantheism

God is absolute and identical with the world. The world, although real, is therefore changeless.

Relativistic monistic pantheism

The world is real and changing and is within God (e.g., as the body of God). But God remains nonetheless absolute and is not affected by the world.

Acosmic pantheism

The absolute God makes up the total reality. The world is an appearance and ultimately unreal.

Identity of opposites pantheism

The opposites of ordinary discourse are identified in the supreme instance. God and his relation to the world are described in terms that are formally contradictory; thus, reality is not subject to rational description. Whether being is stressed or the void, whether immanence is or transcendence, the result is the same: one must go beyond rational description to an intuitive grasp of the ultimate.

Classical theism

God is absolute, eternal, first cause, pure actuality, an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect being. Though related to the world as its cause, he is not affected by the world. He is essentially transcendent over the world; and the world exists relative to him as a temporal effect of his action—containing potentiality as well as actuality and characterized by change and finitude. Since all of time is part of God’s eternal “Now,” and since God’s knowledge now includes the total future as though laid out before him like a landscape, it is not clear that, in this system, humanity can have freedom in any significant sense; for although foreknowledge does not of itself determine anything, it vouches for the existence of such determination. Nonetheless, human freedom is in fact asserted by classical theists.

Neoplatonic or emanationistic pantheism

God is absolute in all respects, remote from the world and transcendent over it. This view is like classical theism except that, rather than saying that God is the cause of the world, it holds that the world is an emanation of God, occurring by means of intermediaries. God’s absoluteness is thus preserved while a bridge to the world is provided as well. In Plotinus (3rd century ce), the foremost Neoplatonist, the Nous (Greek, “mind”), a realm of ideas or Platonic forms, serves as the intermediary between God and the world, and the theme of immanence is sustained by positing the existence of a World-Soul that both contains and animates the world.

Panentheism

In this alternative, both sets of categories, those of absoluteness and of relativity, of transcendence and of immanence, are held to apply equally to God, who is thus dipolar. He is the cause of the world and its effect; his essence is eternal, but he is involved in time. God’s knowledge includes all that there is to know; since the future is genuinely open, however, and is not in any sense real as yet, he knows it only as a set of possibilities or probabilities. In this alternative, humanity is held to have significant freedom, participating as a co-creator with God in the continuing creation of the world.

With only slight attention being accorded to classical theism (which is covered in another article), the incidence of the preceding eight forms of pantheism and panentheism in cultural history remains to be explored.