Economics

It was economics that first attained the status of an exclusive area of speculation and study among the social sciences. The huge volumes on administration, with their extensive lexicons, written by German cameralists, and that autonomy and self-regulation that the physiocrats and Smith (especially as interpreted by German academics) had found, or thought they had found, in the processes of wealth, in the operation of prices, rents, interest, and wages, during the 18th century became the basis of a separate and distinctive trend of thought, called “political economy,” in the 19th. Hence the emphasis upon what came to be widely called laissez-faire. If, as it was argued, the processes of wealth operate naturally in terms of their own built-in mechanisms, then not only should these be studied separately but they should, in any wise polity, be left alone by government and society. This was, in general, the overriding emphasis of such thinkers as Ricardo, Mill, and Nassau William Senior in England, of Frédéric Bastiat and Say in France, and, somewhat later, the Austrian school of Carl Menger. This emphasis is today called “classical” in economics, and it is even now, though with substantial modifications, a strong position in the field.

There were from the beginning, however, thinkers on the subject, including Smith himself, who diverged sharply from this laissez-faire, classical view. In Germany the enormously influential Friedrich List originated the school of “national economy”—which would be today recognized as economic nationalism, opposing international free trade and advocating protectionist measures for domestic economy (a view with which Smith agreed under certain circumstances, the difference between Smith and List being that the former was a pragmatist, while for the latter the position was a matter of principle). There were also the so-called historical economists, proceeding from the presuppositions of social evolution, referred to above. Such figures as Wilhelm Roscher and Karl Knies in Germany tended to dismiss the assumptions of timelessness and universality regarding economic behaviour that were axiomatic among the German followers of Smith, and they strongly insisted upon the developmental character of capitalism, evolving in a long series of stages from other types of economy.

Also prominent throughout the century were those who came to be called the socialists. They too repudiated any notion of timelessness and universality in capitalism and its elements of private property, competition, and profit. Not only was this system but a passing stage of economic development; it could be—and, as Marx was to emphasize, would be—shortly supplanted by a more humane and also realistic economic system based upon cooperation, the people’s ownership of the means of production, and planning that would eradicate the vices of competition and conflict.

Political science

Rivalling economic thought in popularity during the century was “political science,” so called long before “science” was appropriated as the proper name for the unbiased exploration of the empirical world. The line of systematic interest in the state that had begun in modern Europe with Niccolò Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, among others, widened and lengthened in the 19th century, the consequence of the two revolutions. If the Industrial Revolution seemed to supply all the problems frustrating the existence of a stable and humane society, the political-democratic revolution could be seen as containing many of the answers to these problems. It was the democratic revolution, especially in France, that created the vision of a political government responsible for all aspects of human society and, most important, possessed the power to wield this responsibility. This power, known as sovereignty, could be seen as holding the same relation to political science in the 19th century that capital held to economic thought. A very large number of political “scientists” essentially ruminated on the varied properties of sovereignty. There was a strong tendency on the part of such thinkers as Bentham, Austin, and Mill in England and Francis Lieber and Woodrow Wilson in the United States to see the state and its claimed sovereignty over human lives in much the same terms in which classical political economists saw capitalism.

Among political scientists there was the same historical-evolutionary dissent from this view, however, that existed in political economy. Such writers as Sir Henry Maine in England, Numa Fustel de Coulanges in France, and Otto von Gierke in Germany declared that state and sovereignty were not timeless and universal nor the results of some “social contract” envisaged by such philosophers as Locke and Rousseau but, rather, structures formed slowly through developmental or historical processes. Hence the strong interest, especially in the late 19th century, in the origins of political institutions in kinship, village, and caste, and in the successive stages of development that have characterized these institutions. In political science, as in political economy, in short, the “classical” analytical approach was strongly rivalled by the evolutionary. Both approaches go back to the 18th century in their fundamental elements, but what is seen in the 19th century is the greater systematization and the much wider range of data employed.

Cultural anthropology

Anthropology also originated in the 19th century. Strictly defined as the science of humankind, it could be seen as superseding specialized areas of focus such as political economy and political science. In practice and from the beginning, however, anthropology concerned itself overwhelmingly with small-scale preindustrial societies. On the one hand was physical anthropology, concerned chiefly with the evolution of humans as a biological species, with the successive forms and protoforms of the species, and with genetic systems. On the other hand was social and cultural anthropology: here the interest was in the full range of humankind’s institutions, though its researches were in fact confined to those found among existing preliterate peoples in Africa, Oceania, Asia, and the Americas. Above all other concepts, “culture” was the central element of this great area of anthropology, or ethnology, as it was often called to distinguish it from physical anthropology. Culture, as a concept, called attention to the nonbiological, nonracial, noninstinctual dimension of human life, the basis of what is called civilization: its values, techniques, and ideas in all spheres. Tylor’s landmark work of 1871, Primitive Culture, defined culture as the part of human behaviour that is learned—an inadequate definition, as proved by the fact that much of animal behaviour is also learned, the difference between animal and human behaviour being, rather, in the character of their respective learning: direct among animals and mostly indirect among humans. Since of all social sciences cultural anthropology places the greatest emphasis on the cultural foundations of human behaviour and thought in society, this inadequate definition has been in no small part responsible for the inadequate understanding of culture in all of them.

Scarcely less than political science or political economy, cultural anthropology shared in the themes of the two revolutions and their impact on the world. If the data that cultural anthropologists actually worked with were generally in the remote areas of the world, it was the effects of the two revolutions that, in a sense, kept opening up these parts of the world to their inquiry. And, as was true of the other social sciences, the cultural anthropologists were immersed in economic problems and problems of polity, social class, and community, albeit among preliterate rather than “modern” peoples.

Overwhelmingly, without major exception indeed, cultural anthropology was evolutionary in thrust in the 19th century. Tylor and Sir John Lubbock in England, Morgan in the United States, Adolf Bastian and Theodor Waitz in Germany, and all others in the main line of the study of “primitive” culture saw existing indigenous societies in the world as prototypes of their own “primitive ancestors”—fossilized remains, so to speak, of stages of development that western Europe had once gone through. Despite the vast array of data compiled on non-Western cultures, the same basic European-centred objectives are to be found among cultural anthropologists as among other social thinkers in the century. Almost universally, then, the modern West was regarded as the latest point in a line of progress that was single and unilinear and on which all other peoples in the world could be fitted as illustrations, as it were, of Western people’s own past.