Foreign policy of Charles II

Charles cleared himself by dismissing his old adviser, Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, and tried to assert himself through a more adventurous foreign policy. So far, his reign had made only modest contributions to England’s commercial advancement. The Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663, which had been prompted by the threat to British shipping of the rise of the Dutch carrying trade, were valuable extensions of Cromwellian policies, and the capture of New York in 1664 was one of his few gains from the Dutch. But although marriage to Princess Catherine of Braganza of Portugal in 1662 brought him the possession of Tangier and Bombay, they were of less strategic value than Dunkirk, which he sold to Louis XIV in 1662. Charles was, however, prepared to sacrifice much for the alliance of his young cousin. Through his sister Henrietta Anne, duchess of Orléans, he had direct contact with the French court, and it was through her that he negotiated the startling reversal of the Protestant Triple Alliance (England, the Dutch United Provinces, Sweden) of 1668. By the terms of the so-called Secret Treaty of Dover of May 1670, not only did England and France join in an offensive alliance against the Dutch, but Charles promised to announce his conversion to Roman Catholicism. If this provoked trouble from his subjects, he was assured of French military and financial support. Charles saw to it that the conversion clause of the treaty was not made public.

This clause, which was the most controversial act of Charles II’s reign, can be explained as a shortsighted bid for Louis XIV’s confidence. In this, however, it failed. Louis neither welcomed Charles’s intentions nor believed in them, and, in the event, it was only upon his deathbed that Charles was received into the Roman Catholic Church. But Charles had now fatally compromised himself. Although he subsequently attempted to pursue policies independent of Louis, he remained bound to him by inclination as well as by the fear of blackmail. More seriously, he had lost the confidence of his subjects, who deplored the French alliance and distrusted the whole tendency of Charles’s policies.

Other circumstances deepened Englishmen’s discontent with their king. By the 1670s the miscarriages of the queen had reduced hopes that Charles would have a legitimate heir, and in 1673 the second marriage of his brother James, duke of York, to Mary of Modena, increased the possibility of the Catholic line of succession, for James’s conversion to the Roman church was well known. But it was for his autocratic character as much as for his religion that James was feared as his brother was not, and it was on his brother’s behalf that Charles eventually had to face the severest political storm of his reign.

The Popish Plot of 1678 was an elaborate tissue of fictions built around a skeleton of even stranger truths. The allegations of Titus Oates, a former Anglican cleric who had been expelled from a Jesuit seminary, that Roman Catholics planned to murder Charles to make James king, seemed to be confirmed by scraps of evidence of which Charles was justifiably skeptical. But Charles was obliged to bow before the gusts of national hysteria that sought to bar his brother from the line of succession. Between 1679 and 1681 Charles very nearly lost control of his government. Deprived of his chief minister, the earl of Danby, who had been compromised by his negotiations with France, the king had to allow the earl of Shaftesbury and his Whig supporters, who upheld the power of the Parliament—men whom he detested—to occupy positions of power in central and local government. Three general elections produced three equally unmanageable parliaments, and, although Charles publicly denied the legitimacy of his first son, the Protestant duke of Monmouth, he had to send his Catholic brother James out of the country and offer a plan of limitations that would bind James if he came to the throne. The plan proved to be unacceptable both to the Whigs and to James, and, when Charles fell seriously ill in the summer of 1679, there was real danger of civil conflict.

But Charles kept his nerve. He defended his queen against slanders, dismissed the intractable parliaments, and recovered control of his government. His subjects’ dread of republican anarchy proved stronger than their suspicion of James, and from March 1681, when he dissolved his last Parliament, Charles enjoyed a nationwide surge of loyalty almost as fervent as that of 1660. He had made yet another secret treaty with France and in addition to a French subsidy could now count upon a healthy public revenue. Reforms at the Treasury, which he had inaugurated in 1667, provided the crown with a firm basis of administrative control that was among Charles II’s most valuable legacies to English government.

As a result of these actions, Charles, who died in February 1685 at Whitehall in London, was able to end his reign in the kind of tranquil prosperity he had always sought.

Legacy

Believing that God would not “make a man miserable only for taking a little pleasure out of the way,” he had made quite sure of his own share and left at least 14 illegitimate offspring, of whom only James, duke of Monmouth, played any part in English politics. Mistresses like Barbara Villiers, duchess of Cleveland, and Louise de Kéroualle, duchess of Portsmouth, were always costly and often troublesome, but Charles probably paid a smaller price for his amours than for his laziness. He was tall and active and loved riding and sailing but, although robust enough to outsit his advisers at the Council board, he hated routine and prolonged application. This failing undermined the effectiveness of his government and led to his dependence on France. But the relaxed tolerance he brought to religious matters in the end may have contributed more to the stability of his reign than was lost by his shifty insincerity.

Charles fully shared the interests of the skeptical, materialist century that saw the foundation of the Royal Society under his charter, and he did something to foster technological improvements in navigation and ship design. The sincerity of his interest in England’s naval advancement is held by some historians to be the most important of his redeeming features, although, like his reputation for wit and high intelligence, it may not stand up to close examination. Any verdict on Charles is therefore controversial. A contemporary wrote of him that “he had as good a claim to a kind interpretation as most men,” and on this basis it may be agreed that his image as a man remains more attractive than his reputation as a king.