Administration

The eight countries claiming Arctic territory—Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark (Kalaallit Nunaat/Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland—have different systems of central administration and therefore administer their northlands in different ways. All of them, it may be noted, are technologically advanced states with a relatively high standard of living. But Iceland is the only one in which there is no distinction between a national centre and an Arctic periphery: it lies wholly within the Arctic as defined for this article and has no Indigenous northern people distinct from the majority. The other countries have had to devise a relationship with their Arctic territories in order to permit the operation of government Greenland was a colony of Denmark until 1979, when it obtained home rule under the Danish crown; in effect, all government activities take place in Greenland except in matters of foreign affairs and defense. The contiguous Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, and Finland—treat their northlands as any other part of the country but give them special status in some legal contexts, particularly in matters relating to the northern Indigenous people (Sami). Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, however, is subject to special provisions agreed to internationally and set out in the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920. Alaska, after its purchase by the United States from Russia in 1867, had various forms of colonial status until 1959, when it became a state. Its constitutional position is therefore like that of any other state, although, as in Scandinavia, there is federal legislation concerning the status of Alaskan Natives, and the feeling of dependence is still not wholly absent. In Canada most of the northlands lie in Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and Yukon, entities that are administered by the federal government but which have some local self-government. Russia makes no constitutional provision for Arctic territory but legislates for various activities, such as building regulations and labour law, in an Arctic setting. There has been pressure to set up an Arctic province, covering all the country’s northlands, but this has never been done. Many, but not all, of the northern peoples of Russia acquired a limited degree of administrative autonomy under the Soviet government. At first this did not give any real independence, though it conferred a certain status. But, with the radical changes of the early 1990s and the emergence of a sovereign Russia, the two most numerous Indigenous peoples—the Komi and the Sakha (Yakut)—seemed likely to make real gains in self-government.

Environmental concerns

The growth of economic activity of many kinds in the Arctic has given rise to concern about the natural environment. While similar concern has been expressed in most parts of the world, the Arctic can be shown to be more vulnerable than elsewhere, and control is also more difficult to exercise. One area of disquiet is the damage that can be done by ships, especially in ice-filled waters. Sea ice is a potent agent for causing damage to a ship’s hull or propeller and is a serious obstacle to cleanup operations. A particularly egregious example was the holing of the tanker Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in March 1989, although it was rock, not ice, that pierced the tanker’s hull and released some 250,000 barrels of oil into the ocean. The operation of nuclear-powered ships in Arctic waters has caused public concern in Russia, and two nuclear submarines have sunk in Arctic waters—in the Norwegian Sea in 1989 and in the Barents Sea in 2000.

Air pollution is another possible source of harm. Norway, Sweden, and Finland have complained to Russia about the release of harmful substances in smoke from the nickel refinery and other plants in the Kola Peninsula. American scientists in Alaska have detected nickel particles in the air emanating from Norilsk. The unpleasant and unhealthy phenomenon known as ice fog—whereby particulate matter suspended in the lower atmosphere is trapped by temperature inversion, reducing visibility and creating luminous pillars and haloes—is linked to air pollution.

On the ground, there are many examples of large-scale and unsightly disturbance of the surface, whether by road building, opencut mining, vehicle movement across the tundra, or other human activities. Oil and gas fields have been particularly bad offenders in this respect. When work on them started—in the 1950s in Siberia and in the 1970s in North America—the reaction of frozen ground to heavy vehicle traffic was not yet widely known, so that many areas of swamp and uneven terrain were inadvertently created.

Human activity has also exercised a strong influence on the wildlife of Arctic areas. Polar bears, walrus, musk ox, and caribou all have been greatly reduced in numbers through hunting. The danger was recognized, and protective legislation has been approved (international agreement on protection of the polar bear, achieved in 1973, was a landmark in this process). All the countries concerned established national parks and wildlife refuges in the late 20th century.

The Arctic in international affairs

All land areas in the Arctic are subject to the sovereignty of one of the eight countries concerned, and there is no possibility of a new discovery of land that might cause argument. But this is not the case for sea areas. The phenomenon of “creeping sovereignty,” whereby nation-states claim rights in the sea areas adjacent to their coasts, has created problems. In particular, the boundary line at sea between two countries’ exclusive economic zones has not in every case been agreed upon. The most pressing of these was the division between Norway and Russia of the Barents Sea continental shelf, a 67,600-square mile (175,000-square km) area that probably contains hydrocarbons. In 2010 the two countries agreed to a boundary that divided the disputed area into approximately equal sections.

Another question of sovereignty—and therefore jurisdiction—is over floating ice. An ice floe in the central Arctic basin, beyond exclusive economic zones, may have structures built on it and people living there. Questions arose at an American scientific station, T-3, when a murder was committed there. It was decided in that case to equate the station with a U.S. ship, and the trial was therefore held under U.S. law. But the argument is not closed, since the ship analogy may not always be appropriate.

Strategy has played an important part in Arctic affairs since 1945. Up to then the technology necessary for operating in the region was largely lacking, but advances during and after World War II have opened the way to many sorts of activity. The Arctic Ocean is a mediterranean sea that lies, moreover, between the two powers long supposed most likely to be in conflict. Thus each side feared air attack across the Arctic Ocean and built chains of radar stations at high latitudes in its own territory to give warning of this. In North America four such chains were built successively—the Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Another strategic use of the Arctic Ocean derives from its solid surface, which offers protection to submarines operating under the ice. Both U.S. and Soviet submarines made numerous and extensive patrols in this area, and mastery of the technique allowed Soviet missile-firing submarines (which were designed for this role) to target any part of U.S. territory from an ice-covered location in the Arctic Ocean, probably within close reach of their main base at Murmansk.

Besides these war-oriented possibilities, the Arctic has in the past offered some opportunities for advancing peaceful causes. The openness and emptiness of the Arctic make it a good location for such confidence-building measures as the “open skies” schemes, whereby each side would allow the other to inspect from the air agreed pieces of its Arctic territory. The development of satellite imagery has reduced the relevance of such schemes, but there are still ways in which they could be useful. The Soviet government took advantage of the remoteness factor to locate a nuclear weapons testing ground on the north island of Novaya Zemlya. Since the late 1980s the presence of the testing site has incurred much criticism from northern Indigenous people living in the region.

Another important sphere of possible international cooperation is scientific study of the region. There has long been a sense of community among Arctic explorers of many nations, leading often to informal collaboration. In recent years this has become more formalized, and joint programs of investigation have been elaborated, particularly in the fields of geophysics and biology. Such programs have proliferated, and they vary greatly in size and scope. A need has been felt for coordination, perhaps along the lines of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), which worked successfully in the late 20th century. In 1990 the eight Arctic countries set up a nongovernmental International Arctic Science Committee (IASC); other countries with a serious interest in Arctic research could join in the work. It remains to be seen whether this committee, set up with the best intentions by a small group of active Arctic scientists, plays the helpful and useful role it was designed to do or whether it becomes one more bureaucratic obstacle to grassroots initiative.

International cooperation of a different kind is manifested by the creation in 1977 of a Pan-Inuit movement, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC). First proposed by an Alaskan Native, Eben Hopson, this group has provided a forum for discussing issues of common interest to Inuit from the four Arctic countries in which they live—Russia, Canada, the United States, and Greenland. Recognized by the United Nations as a nongovernmental organization, it shows every sign of playing a significant role in Arctic affairs.