Evaluation of Platonism

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The essential point at issue between Platonists and their opponents through the centuries has been the existence (in some sense) of a spiritual or intelligible reality that is independent of the world, and is the ultimate origin of both existence and values. This is a very rough generalization that does not apply to the Skeptical Academy (see above Greek Platonism from Aristotle through Middle Platonism) or do full justice to the thought of the 20th-century skeptical Platonist George Santayana. Platonists have understood this central doctrine in a great variety of ways and defended it with a great variety of arguments. But whenever it has been strongly held, it seems to have been by a faith depending on some sort of experience rather than simply on the conclusion of an argument. Its opponents have generally followed the lines of attack laid down by Aristotle (and to some extent anticipated by Plato in the first part of his Parmenides), that the doctrine involves the duplication of reality and the postulation of entities for the existence of which no sufficient evidence or arguments can be offered and the relationship of which to the world of sense experience cannot be intelligibly stated. The argument continues and will perhaps never finally be settled, but there can be no doubt about the central importance of Platonism in the history of European thought.

A. Hilary Armstrong Henry J. Blumenthal