Germany

Although Ranke’s influence was enhanced by his longevity (he lived to the age of 91), it was mainly due to the seductive synthesis he offered. He maintained that scholarship could produce historical truth; he held a conception of the divine will that linked it to the existing nation-states of 19th-century Europe; and he possessed a considerable literary gift. Even in Germany, however, his sway was never absolute, and by the end of the century his style of history was under assault from a number of directions.

Ranke’s philosophy of history, which he usually articulated in prefaces or asides, was examined by Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–84) in a series of lectures eventually published as the Historik. Droysen maintained that Ranke’s critical method and literary virtuosity had created an aura of scientific accuracy that shielded his faulty theistic interpretations. Rather than focusing on a core of ascertainable facts, however, Droysen emphasized how the same set of facts could be accounted for in different ways. The French Revolution, for example, could be the subject of at least four forms of discourse: investigative, narrative, didactic, and discussive (mixtures of these being found in most historical works). Of these, Droysen favoured the discussive, because it was explicitly addressed to the relevance that historical knowledge might have to society. The past is inaccessible except through its “remains,” which can be interpreted pragmatically, focusing on the aims of the actors in historical events; conditionally, stressing the material conditions under which actions take place; psychologically, comprising both character types and the element of individual personality and will; or ethically, contemplating the events under moral categories. By drawing attention to representative practices, by conceiving history as a discourse, and by arguing that no historian could give an unmediated account of “how it actually was,” Droysen undercut the foundations on which Ranke’s work rested, though this was all but unrecognized at the time.

Another attack came from those who believed that history should model itself after the natural sciences, especially physics. In their view, the reliance on intuition ensured that historiography would always be imprecise. Such critics also believed that the invocation of notions such as Spirit, Volk, or God was a mere mystification and that the focus on the individual or the particular rather than the general was misguided. Although very few historians fully embraced this position, some had ambitions in that direction. Among them was Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915), whose 12-volume Deutsche Geschichte (1891–1901: “German History”) elicited a furious response from historians in Germany. Lamprecht’s transgressions were two-fold: he criticized the prevailing idealist approach to history, and he made social and cultural life, rather than the formation of the state, the central theme. His opponents accused him of having socialist sympathies (which was doubtful) and of attempting to undo the tradition of historiography that had made Germany admired throughout the world. Lamprecht sought to find laws of collective psychology governing the behaviour of Germans. His approach found few followers in Germany but had somewhat more influence in the United States. It was in any case a symptom of a widespread desire to find a different and more scientific basis for history.

France

The most important voices calling for a new scientific history were heard in France and the United States. France had its own tradition of documentary criticism, stemming from the humanist scholars of the 16th century and stimulated by the founding of the École des Chartes (School of Paleography) in 1821. More resistant to German influence than any other European country, it also produced Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the prophet of scientific laws in history.

Comte, inventor of the word sociology and often regarded as the founder of the discipline, propounded an elaborate tripartite view of historical development. Humanity, he declared, had already passed through two stages, the theological and the philosophical. In the former, divinities or spiritual forces were believed to be the causes of natural and human events. In the philosophical period, natural laws were discovered, but the world of human events was still held to be indeterminate, and thought was confused by the belief in essences, teleologies, and other unobservable forces. The advent of the positive period was the French Revolution, which liberated humans from their theological fancies and philosophical mistakes. Henceforth, Comte prophesied, humans would rely only on what their senses told them and would seek out the laws that governed the human world. The aggregate of these laws would be sociology. Observations would be provided by historians; but historians, incapable of fully understanding their own discoveries, would rely on sociologists to place their observations under appropriate laws. This program, not surprisingly, did not appeal to historians, but it did offer an ideal for uniting all aspects of society in a single analytical framework.

In 1900 the French philosopher Henri Berr founded the social-science journal Revue de Synthèse Historique, which attracted contributions from some French historians. Berr’s program for “historical synthesis” was more ambitious than any single historian could achieve; he called for teams of scholars from various disciplines to engage in empirical historical research with the aim of synthesizing their discoveries. Berr argued that no discipline could proceed without some sort of logical method that would involve hypothesis and synthesis as well as analysis. In this respect he agreed with the leading figure in French social science, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), who established the journal L’Année Sociologique at about the same time. Although many French historians remained more traditional in their practice, Berr in 1907 recruited both Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1866–1944) as collaborators on the Revue. Together these men would challenge and revolutionize the study of history in France and in the rest of the world.

While at the University of Strasbourg, which then was on the margins of the French historical profession, Bloch and Febvre produced important works of their own, often focused on what became known as the history of mentalités, or popular attitudes and unconscious preconceptions. Although both eventually attained chairs at universities in Paris, it was not until after World War II that they achieved a significant following—by then Bloch had been shot by the Nazis for his participation in the French resistance. After the war, the Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, which they had founded in 1929 as Annales d’histoire économique et sociale, became the most influential historical journal in the world (the title was changed again in 1994, to Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales). Its impact was vastly enhanced by the capture by the Annalistes of the newly reconstituted Sixth Section of the École des Hautes Études (School of Higher Studies). Eventually, as a result of bureaucratic centralization in France and the willingness of the government to commit funds to higher education in order to gain cultural prestige, the directorate of the Sixth Section was virtually able to supervise historical research in the country.

The United States

Whereas in 1875 there was hardly anything that could be called a historical profession in the United States, by 1900 the American Historical Association (AHA) and its journal, the American Historical Review, as well as a number of university Ph.D. programs in history, had been established. No clique of senior professors in the great universities could have achieved the sort of dominance in the United States that was possible in France or Germany, but there was nevertheless a struggle to create a group of historians, highly trained in the approved German manner, to claim the national history from the hands of the great amateurs such as Bancroft, Prescott, and Parkman. For a while amateurs coexisted amicably with the professionals (Bancroft was the second president of the AHA), but they soon withdrew to found more-congenial forums such as the Mississippi Valley Historical Review (now the Journal of American History). This prompted former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, who served as president of the AHA in 1912, to complain, not without reason, that the professionals were squeezing all the life out of history; their expertise was bought at the cost of pedantry in the profession and boredom among the public.

As they professionalized the teaching and writing of history, the new academic historians sought to dislodge the picture of the American past that had been painted by their predecessors. The first shock occurred in 1893, when Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932) delivered a paper on his “frontier thesis.” Whereas Bancroft and most other leading historians of his generation had claimed that the early settlers of New England brought with them the germs of “Teutonic liberty,” Turner—inspired by the announcement of the U.S. Census Bureau in 1890 that the western frontier was now “closed” (or entirely occupied)—declared that the decisive experience in American history had been that of pioneers as they pressed westward, settling the “empty” frontier. On the frontier, he declared, Americans developed their most distinctive characteristics: egalitarianism, self-help, and pragmatism.

Few important historical writings have ever rested on such a slender empirical basis. The “emptiness” of the frontier was an illusion created by the Census Bureau, which made no count of the Native Americans who inhabited these lands. Although the frontier thesis had been anticipated by Hegel, Turner’s genius lay in bringing it forward at just the right time. The closing of the frontier did mark the end of a readily understandable period in American history.

Turner not only introduced a new conception of American history but also wrested the historical spotlight from Harvard and New England and shone it on his native Wisconsin and points west. His book The United States, 1830–1850: The Nation and Its Sections (1935), emphasized the importance of sectional conflict and demonstrated how cultural traits interacted with the natural environment; he thus achieved his goal of making history not just “the brilliant annals of the few” but also the story of “the degraded tillers of the soil, toiling that others might dream.”

A generation of Turner’s younger contemporaries, most notably Charles Beard (1874–1948), Carl Becker (1873–1945), and James Harvey Robinson (1863–1936), issued the first of many calls in the 20th century for a “new history.” Although there was actually little novelty in the methods they advocated, they all aspired, like Turner, to reinterpret American history in the interest of a more democratic and rational society.

This desire to challenge conventional wisdom led to new works, including Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). Although he did not claim that his was the only possible interpretation of the founding document, he asserted as a fundamental principle that

different degrees and kinds of property inevitably exist in modern society; party doctrines and ‘principles’ originate in the sentiments and views which the possession of various kinds of property creates in the minds of the possessors; class and group divisions based on property lie at the basis of modern government; and politics and constitutional law are inevitably a reflex of these contending interests.

Beard neatly expressed his reinterpretation of the American Revolution by saying that it concerned the issue not just of home rule but of who should rule at home.