Context effects
- Related Topics:
- space perception
- illusion
- time perception
- hallucination
- movement perception
- On the Web:
- The Berkeley Well-Being Institute - Perception: Definition, Examples, & Types (Mar. 21, 2025)
One of the simplest instance of relational (or context) effects in perception is that of brightness contrast. Thus, the apparent brightness of a stimulus depends not only on its own luminance but also on that of the surrounding stimulation. The same gray square looks whiter against a dark background and blacker when placed in a bright surround. Similarly, a white or gray patch will take on an apparent hue that is complementary to the colour of the surround (e.g., the patch will seem tinged with yellow when it is placed against a blue background).
Analogous context effects are evident in many commonplace experiences. A man of average height seems to be a runt when he is on a basketball court with much taller players; yet the same man looms like a giant when refereeing a game played by little boys. It is known that a typical winter’s day seems delightfully balmy when temperatures rise after a week of subfreezing weather.
To the Gestaltist, contrast effects dramatize the relational nature of perception. They also play a significant role in a more recently developed adaptation-level theory, which also provides a general perceptual model. At the core of the model is the notion that the manner in which a stimulus is perceived depends not only on its own physical characteristics but also on those of surrounding stimuli and of stimuli previously experienced by the observer. In other words, the perceiver is said to be perceptually adapted to past sensory stimuli; his adaptation level forms a kind of zero point against which any new stimulus is perceived. An example is provided by the almost overwhelming silence one experiences when the sound of an air conditioner (to which he has adapted) suddenly ceases.
Gestalt theorists also attached significance to the observer’s history of stimulation; indeed, some of them interpreted so-called figural aftereffects within a Gestaltist model of brain functioning. Figural aftereffects refer to changes in the perceived shape or location of a figure following its inspection; for example, a curved line will appear to get straighter after prolonged inspection. Or the distance between two parallel lines seems to change as an aftereffect of previous inspection.
In a typical experiment one looks at a point adjacent to a dark vertical bar (the inspection figure) on a screen. Following this inspection period, the dark bar is replaced by two identical pairs of vertical lines, one pair on either side of the region where the bar had been, the second pair alongside in a region not previously exposed to the inspection figure. The subject again fixates the same point. A figural aftereffect shows up as a greater apparent distance between the pair of lines surrounding the region of the inspection figure even though the other pair is actually identical. This distortion is not simply a generalized contrast effect because it occurs only in the small area along the borders of the inspection figure; that is, the effect is localized and restricted.
It thus has been speculated that visual exposure to a figure induces in the brain a condition of localized satiation. The passage of electrical activity is assumed to be impeded in satiated areas of the brain. Moreover, it is postulated that the perceived distance between two borders of a figure is directly related to the time it takes for electrical currents to pass between them. Thus, it is held that one effect of satiation is to increase the apparent distance between the borders of a figure that straddles a satiated region. Whatever the merits of such physiological speculations, they have stimulated a vast amount of research on figural aftereffects. Good evidence for similar effects in other senses, such as touch, also has been obtained. Clearly, perception can be influenced not only by the context of current background but also by the residues (after-effects) of previous stimulation.
Concurrent visual stimulation may modify one’s acuity in detecting auditory stimuli. Similar interactions are claimed to occur for other combinations of senses. Some dentists report success in using audioanalgesia, in which stimulation with sound waves is said to reduce the experience of pain in the mouth. The high specificity of some of the reported sensory interactions seems to preclude an explanation that concurrent stimulation works by changing the subject’s general level of alertness. However these intersensory effects might be mediated, they do suggest that the brain does not function as a collection of entirely independent sensory channels. As a physical system, the brain follows physical principles; thus overlapping and spreading or waning fields of neural excitation in the brain have been theorized to underlie such phenomena as closure and audioanalgesia. Köhler referred to these models of neural analogues of perceptual phenomena as physical Gestalten; unfortunately, there is little direct physiological evidence for them.
An alternative to field effects in brain functioning is the assumption that local stimulation gives rise, in one-to-one fashion, to a mosaic of local responses. Implicit in the mosaic hypothesis is a kind of telephone switchboard model of the brain as a machine in which the electrical activity is strictly confined to separate pathways of neurons that are well insulated (isolated) from one another. The Gestaltists rejected this model because in its early formulations it did not explain intersensory and intrasensory perceptual phenomena. A more sophisticated machine model, however, provides for fieldlike effects through the operation of complex networks of neural elements. It is held that electrical activity remains confined to discrete pathways, but that these pathways do not simply travel straight through the system; that they also interconnect, with both excitatory and inhibitory consequences. Supporting evidence comes from records of the electrical activity in single neurons in the cat brain; when the cat’s eye is probed by a small spot of light, a specific area on the retina can be found that serves to excite a given brain neuron.
Further mapping of the cat retina often uncovers inhibitory areas adjacent to the one that is excitatory; that is, when light strikes those retinal areas the activity in the brain neuron being monitored is depressed. The excitatory and inhibitory areas thus comprise the brain neuron’s retinal receptive field. Analogous inhibitory effects have also been found in research on the eye of the crab, Limulus. Such context effects as brightness contrast could be based on these simple inhibitory mechanisms. It remains to be seen, however, just how many perceptual phenomena that fit Gestalt field theory also can be handled by sophisticated variants of the machine or mosaic model.
Perceptual constancies
Even though the retinal image of a receding automobile shrinks in size, the normal, experienced person perceives the size of the object to remain constant. Indeed, one of the most impressive features of perceiving is the tendency of objects to appear stable in the face of their continually changing stimulus features. Though a dinner plate itself does not change, its image on the retina undergoes considerable changes in shape and size as the perceiver and plate move. What is noteworthy is stability in perception despite gross instability in stimulation. Such matches between the object as it is perceived and the object as it is understood to actually exist (regardless of transformations in the energy of stimulation) are called perceptual constancies.
Dimensions of visual experience that exhibit constancy include size, shape, brightness, and colour. Perceptual constancy tends to prevail for these dimensions as long as the observer has appropriate contextual cues; for example, perception of size constancy depends on cues that allow one a valid assessment of his distance from the object. With distance accurately perceived, the apparent size of an object tends to remain remarkably stable, especially for highly familiar objects that have a standard size. Thus, people’s heads all tend to look the same size regardless of distance; similarly, an object identified as a lump of coal tends to look black even when intensely illuminated.
The experience of constancy may break down under extreme conditions. If distance is sufficiently great, for example, the perceived size of objects will decrease; thus, viewed from an airplane in flight, there seem to be “toy” houses, cars, and people below. To the extent that they prevail, the constancies lend the perceiver’s experience and behaviour relative stability. Imagine an alternative, kaleidoscopic perceptual world in which everything seems to change, solid objects apparently swelling, shrinking, and warping with every movement. Breakdown in perceptual constancy seems to complicate the course of some psychiatric disorders in which the perceptual boundary between the sufferer and the external world is weakened. Normal constancies also can be intentionally overcome, as in paintings of flabby watches and distorted people that apparently depict the unique perceptual world of the artist.
Individual differences in perceiving
Theoretical assertions about perceiving are often made as though they apply indiscriminately to all organisms, or at least to all people. Perhaps perceptual principles of such great generality eventually will be uncovered. In the meantime it is evident that there are clear differences in perceptual functioning among individuals, among classes of individuals, and within the same individual from one occasion to another.
Age
That perceptual functioning should change with the perceiver’s age is expected on the grounds that psychological development stems from maturation and learning. Indeed, empirical evidence for age-related changes in perceiving is substantial. There are, for example, reliable data that perceptual constancies are enhanced with the person’s increasing age, improvement leveling off at about age ten. Similarly, there is a great deal of evidence for both decreased and increased susceptibility to various optical illusions with increasing age. Those illusions that become less pronounced with increasing age probably depend on the subject’s changes in scanning and on his increased ability to segregate parts of a pattern from one another; illusions that become more pronounced probably reflect the operation of expectancies that develop through experience. Anatomical and physiological changes in the eye itself also may account for some age-related perceptual changes.
Historically, the perceptual role of learning was a source of controversy. Vigorous denials that perceiving is influenced by learning are found in arguments of early Gestalt psychologists (e.g., Max Wertheimer, 1880–1943, a German). By contrast, heavy reliance is placed on learning processes in the writings of the German philosopher and scientist H.L.F. von Helmholtz (1821–94). Today, there is virtually full agreement that perceiving is modified by learning. Disputes now focus on the process of perceptual learning itself. Most theoretical alternatives reflect two underlying themes: discovery and enrichment. The discovery thesis is reflected in Eleanor J. Gibson’s view that perceptual learning is a process of discovering how to transform previously overlooked potentials of sensory stimulation into effective information. Enrichment theories depict perceptual learning as enriching sensory experience with specific associations and with rules for its interpretation that derive from past experience. Discovery theories propose that perceptual modification results from learning to respond to new aspects of sensory stimuli, while enrichment theories hold that such modification results from learning to respond differently to the same sensory stimuli.
Direct confrontations of these positions are rare, their advocates tending to differ in their selection of experimental procedures and learning situations. It may be that discovery and enrichment theories are compatible, simply accounting for different forms of perceptual learning.
General acceptance of the perceptual role of learning should not be taken to endorse the claim that perceiving originally depends on learning. Indeed, studies of human newborn and very young infants indicate highly organized and stable perceptual functions. Learning is to be regarded as supplementary to unlearned factors that mediate perceiving.