Parties and political power

The struggle for power

It is possible in theory to distinguish revolutionary parties, which attempt to gain power by violence (conspiracies, guerrilla warfare, etc.), from those parties working within the legal framework of elections. But the distinction is not always easy to make, because the same parties may sometimes make use of both procedures, either simultaneously or successively, depending upon the circumstances. In the 1920s, for example, communist parties sought power through elections at the same time that they were developing an underground activity of a revolutionary nature. In the 19th century, liberal parties were in the same situation, sometimes employing the techniques of conspiracy, as in Italy, Austria, Germany, Poland, and Russia, and sometimes confining their struggles to the ballot box, as in Great Britain and France.

Revolutionary methods vary greatly. Clandestine plots by which minority groups seize the centres of power presuppose monarchies or dictatorships in which the masses of people have little say in government. But terrorist and disruptive activity can serve to mobilize citizens and to demonstrate the powerlessness of any government. At the beginning of the 20th century, leftist trade unionists extolled the revolutionary general strike, a total stoppage of all economic activity that would paralyze society completely and put the government at the revolutionaries’ mercy. Rural guerrilla activity has often been used in countries with a predominantly agrarian society; urban guerrilla warfare was effective in the European revolutions of the 19th century, but the development of techniques of police and military control has made such activity more difficult.

Revolutionary parties are less numerous than parties that work within the law: the contest at election time is the means normally used in the struggle for power. Such activity corresponds, morever, to the original nature of political parties and involves three factors: the organization of propaganda, the selection of candidates, and the financing of campaigns. The first function is the most visible. The party first of all gives the candidate a label that serves to introduce the candidate to the voters and to identify the candidate’s position. Because of this party label the voters are better able to distinguish the candidates. The promises and declarations of individuals are seldom taken with too much seriousness, and it means more to indicate that one candidate is a communist, another a socialist, a third a fascist, and a fourth a liberal. Finally, the party also furnishes the candidate with workers to raise funds, put up posters, distribute literature, organize meetings, and canvass from door to door.

The function of selecting candidates is exercised in three ways. In cadre parties, candidates are selected by committees of the party activists who make up the party—the caucus system, as it is known in the United States. In general, local committees play essential roles in this regard. In some countries, however, the selection is centralized by a national caucus, as, for example, by the Conservative Party in Britain and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) party in the Netherlands. In mass-based parties, selection is made by members of the regional and national congresses according to apparently democratic procedures; in actual practice, the governing committees play an essential role, the local constituency members generally ratifying their choice. Thirdly, in the United States the mechanism of primary elections has established a system for selecting candidates by means of the votes of all party members or all voters within a particular electoral district.

The various processes of selecting candidates do not, however, differ significantly in their results, for it is almost always the party leaders who play the essential role. This introduces an oligarchical tendency into party politics, a tendency that has not been overcome by the congresses of the mass-based parties or the U.S. primaries, which provide only a partial limitation on the power of the governing committees.

An important aspect of the struggle for power between political parties is the financing of campaigns. Cadre parties always have in their committees some key figure who is responsible for collecting gifts from corporations and wealthy individuals. In mass-based parties, rather than looking for large sums of money from a few people, leaders gather smaller sums from a large number of people who usually give on a monthly or annual basis. This method has been viewed as one of the distinguishing characteristics of mass-based parties. Sometimes the law intervenes in the financing of elections and of parties. Laws often limit campaign expenses and attempt to restrict the resources of the parties, but they are generally inoperative because it is quite easy to circumvent them. In some countries the state contributes public funds to the parties. At first, such financial participation was limited to expenses for campaigns and was based on the uniform treatment of candidates (as in France), but in Sweden and Finland the state contributes to the general finances of parties.

Participation in power

Only the functions of parties in democratic regimes will be considered in this section. The role of the single party in a dictatorship will be analyzed separately (see below Single-party systems).

Once a political party has achieved electoral victory, the question arises of how much influence the party is to have on the government. The influence of the party on members in elective office is frequently quite weak. It defines the general lines of their activity, but these lines can be quite hazy, and few decisions are taken in the periodic meetings between officeholders and their party. Each member of the legislature retains personal freedom of action in participation in debates, in participation in government, and, especially, in voting. The party may, of course, attempt to enforce the party line, but parliamentary or congressional members cannot be compelled to vote the way the party wants them to. Such is the situation in the United States, within most of the liberal and conservative European parties, and within cadre parties in general.

The question of how disciplined a party is, of the extent to which it will always present a united front, enables a distinction to be made between what may be termed rigid and flexible parties—that is, between those that attempt always to be united and disciplined, following what is most often an ideologically based party line, and those that, representing a broader range of interests and points of view, form legislatures that are assemblies of individuals rather than of parties.

Whether the parties operating within a particular system will be rigid or flexible depends largely on the constitutional provisions that determine the circumstances in which a government may continue in office. This is clearly illustrated by comparing the situation in the United States with that in Great Britain. In the United States the president and government continue in office for the constitutionally defined period of four years, regardless of whether a majority in the legislature supports the president or not. Since a united party is thus not crucial to the immediate survival of the government, both major parties are able to contain broad coalitions of interests, and votes on issues of major importance frequently split each party. In the United Kingdom the situation is quite different. There government can continue in office only so long as it commands a majority in the legislature. A single adverse vote can result in the dissolution of Parliament and a general election. Party discipline and unity are thus of crucial importance, and this fact has far-reaching consequences for the composition, organization, and policies of each party. The consequences of party disunity within such a constitutional framework are well illustrated by the weakness and instability of the governments of the Third and Fourth French republics.

The distinction between flexible and rigid parties applies equally to parties in power and to those forming the opposition. Votes of censure or of lack of confidence, votes on proposed legislation or on the budget, questions put to ministers or challenges made to them—in short, all the functions of an opposition party—are worked out differently in flexible and rigid party systems.

In flexible party systems the absence of strong discipline is often of great consequence to the opposition party because only rigid parties can constitute an opposition force sufficiently strong to counterbalance the strength of the party in power. At the same time, party discipline permits the opposition to present the public with an alternative to the majority party; the logical consequence of such a situation is Britain’s “shadow cabinet,” which accustoms the electorate to the idea that a new group is ready to take over the reins of government.

Parties provide, moreover, a channel of communication between opposition legislators and the public. The governing party performs a similar service for the government, although it is less necessary, since the government has at its disposal numerous means of communicating with the public. Opposition parties thus provide a means of expressing negative reaction to decisions of government and proposing alternatives. This role justifies official recognition being given to opposition parties, as is the case in Great Britain and Scandinavia.

Power and representation

It is difficult to envisage how representative democracy could function in a large industrialized society without political parties. In order for citizens to be able to make an intelligent choice of representative or president, it is necessary for them to know the real political orientation of each candidate. Party membership provides the clearest indication of this. The programs and promises of each individual candidate are not too significant or informative, because most candidates, in their attempt to gain the most votes, try to avoid difficult subjects; they all tend to speak the same language—that is, to camouflage their real opinions. The fact that one is a socialist, another a conservative, a third a liberal, and a fourth a communist provides a far better clue as to how the candidate will perform when in office. In the legislature the discipline of the party limits the possibility that elected representatives will change their minds and their politics, and thus the party label acts as a sort of guarantee that there will be at least some correspondence between promise and performance. Parties make possible the representation of varying shades of opinion by synthesizing different positions into a stance that each representative adopts to a greater or lesser extent.

But parties, like all organizations, tend to manipulate their members, to bring them under the control of an inner circle of leaders that often perpetuates itself by cooptation. In cadre parties, members are manipulated by powerful committees containing cliques of influential party leaders. In mass-based parties, leaders are chosen by the members, but incumbents are very often reelected because they control the party apparatus, using it to ensure their continuation in power.

Democratic political systems, while performing the function of representation, thus rest more or less on the competition of rival oligarchies. But these oligarchies consist of political elites that are open to all with political ambition. No modern democracy could function without parties, the oligarchical tendencies of which are best regarded as a necessary evil.