Dependence and disintegration in the global village, 1973–87
Events after the 1960s seemed to suggest that the world was entering an era both of complex interdependence among states and of disintegration of the normative values and institutions by which international behaviour had, to a reliable extent, been made predictable. Perhaps this was not an anomaly, for if modern weapons, communications satellites, and global finance and commerce really had created a “global village,” in which the security and well-being of all peoples were interdependent, then by the same token the opportunities had never been greater for ethnic, religious, ideological, or economic differences to spark resentment and conflict among the villagers.
In a world so seemingly out of control, it was perhaps a wonder that politics were not even more violent and anarchic, for the liberal dreams of progress nurtured in the 19th century had surely proved false. The spread of modern technology and economic growth around the world had not necessarily increased the number of societies based on human rights and the rule of law, nor had multilateral institutions like the United Nations or financial and economic interdependence created a higher unity and common purpose among nations, except within the durable and democratic North Atlantic alliance.
Instead, the world after the 1960s saw a proliferation of violence at every level except war among developed nations, a world financial structure under tremendous strain, the worst economic downturn since the 1930s and reduced growth rates thereafter, recurrent fears of an energy crisis, the depletion of resources and concurrent global pollution, famine and genocidal dictators in parts of Africa and Asia, the rise of an aggressive religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world, and widespread political terrorism in the Middle East and Europe. The superpowers never ceased to compete in the realms of strategic weapons and influence in the Third World and thus failed to sustain their brief experiment with détente. As President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, concluded: “The factors that make for international instability are gaining the historical upper hand over the forces that work for more organized cooperation. The unavoidable conclusion of any detached analysis of global trends is that social turmoil, political unrest, economic crisis, and international friction are likely to become more widespread during the remainder of this century.”
The decline of détente
General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon were understandably optimistic in the wake of the endorsement by the 24th Party Congress of the Soviet peace program in 1971 and Nixon’s landslide reelection in 1972. Both expected their new relationship to mature over the course of Nixon’s second term. Détente, however, had fragile foundations in foreign as well as domestic policy. The Soviets viewed it as a form of mere peaceful coexistence in which revolutionary forces could be expected to take advantage of the new American restraint, while the U.S. administration implicitly sold détente as a means of restraining Communist activity around the world. American conservatives were bound to lose faith in détente with each new incident of Soviet assertiveness, while liberals remained hostile to Nixon himself, his realpolitik, and his predilection for the use of force. Between 1973 and 1976 Soviet advances in the Third World, the destruction of Nixon’s presidency in the Watergate scandal, and congressional actions to limit the foreign policy prerogatives of the White House undermined the domestic foundations of détente. After 1977 the U.S.S.R. seemed to take advantage of the Carter administration’s vacillations in Third World conflicts and in arms-control talks, until the Democrats themselves reluctantly announced the demise of détente following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.