Peacemaking, 1919–22
The bells, flags, crowds, and tears of Armistice Day 1918 testified to the relief of exhausted Europeans that the killing had stopped and underscored their hopes that a just and lasting peace might repair the damage, right the wrongs, and revive prosperity in a broken world. Woodrow Wilson’s call for a new and democratic diplomacy, backed by the suddenly commanding prestige and power of the United States, suggested that the dream of a New Jerusalem in world politics was not merely Armistice euphoria. A century before, Europe’s aristocratic rulers had convened in the capital of dynasties, Vienna, to fashion a peace repudiating the nationalist and democratic principles of the French Revolution. Now, democratic statesmen would convene in the capital of liberty, Paris, to remake a Europe that had overthrown monarchical imperialism once and for all in this “war to end war.”
In fact, the immense destruction done to the political and economic landmarks of the prewar world would have made the task of peacemaking daunting even if the victors had shared a united vision, which they did not. Central and eastern Europe were in a turmoil in the wake of the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman collapses. Revolution sputtered in Berlin and elsewhere, and civil war in Russia. Trench warfare had left large swaths of northern France, Belgium, and Poland in ruin. The war had cost millions of dead and wounded and more than $236,000,000,000 in direct costs and property losses. Ethnic hatreds and rivalries could not be expunged at a stroke, and their persistence hindered the effort to draw or redraw dozens of boundaries, including those of the successor states emerging from the Habsburg empire. In the colonial world the war among the imperial powers gave a strong impetus to nationalist movements. India alone provided 943,000 soldiers and workers to the British war effort, and the French empire provided the home country with 928,000. These men brought home a familiarity with European life and the new anti-imperialist ideas of Wilson or Lenin. The war also weakened the European powers vis-à-vis the United States and Japan, destroyed the prewar monetary stability, and disrupted trade and manufactures. In sum, a return to 1914 “normalcy” was impossible. But what could, or should, replace it? As the French foreign minister Stéphen Pichon observed, the war’s end meant only that “the era of difficulties begins.”
The Paris Peace Conference ultimately produced five treaties, each named after the suburban locale in which it was signed: the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (June 28, 1919); the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria (September 10, 1919); the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (November 27, 1919); the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (June 4, 1920); and the Treaty of Sèvres with Ottoman Turkey (August 10, 1920). In addition, the Washington Conference treaties on naval armaments, China, and the Pacific (1921–22) established a postwar regime in those areas.
Competing visions of stability
The idealist vision
According to the armistice agreement the peace was to be based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points. But the French and British had already expressed reservations about them, and, in many cases, the vague Wilsonian principles lent themselves to varying interpretations when applied to complex realities. Nevertheless, Wilson anticipated the peace conference with high hopes that his principles would prevail, either because of their popularity with common people everywhere, or because U.S. financial leverage would oblige European statesmen to follow his lead. “Tell me what is right,” he instructed his delegation on the George Washington en route to Paris, “and I will fight for it.” Unique among the victor powers, the United States would not ask any territorial gains or reparations and would thereby be free to stand proudly as the conference’s conscience and honest broker.
Wilsonianism, as it came to be called, derived from the liberal internationalism that had captured large segments of the Anglo-American intellectual elite before and during the war. It interpreted war as essentially an atavism associated with authoritarian monarchy, aristocracy, imperialism, and economic nationalism. Such governments still practiced an old diplomacy of secret alliances, militarism, and balance of power politics that bred distrust, suspicion, and conflict. The antidotes were democratic control of diplomacy, self-determination for all nations, open negotiations, disarmament, free trade, and especially a system of international law and collective security to replace raw power as the arbiter of disputes among states. This last idea, developed by the American League to Enforce Peace (founded in 1915), found expression in the Fourteen Points as “a general association of nations” and was to be the cornerstone of Wilson’s edifice. He expected a functioning League of Nations to correct whatever errors and injustices might creep in to the treaties themselves.
Liberal internationalism set the tone for the Paris Peace Conference. European statesmen learned quickly to couch their own demands in Wilsonian rhetoric and to argue their cases on grounds of “justice” rather than power politics. Yet Wilson’s principles proved, one by one, to be inapplicable, irrelevant, or insufficient in the eyes of European governments, while the idealistic gloss they placed on the treaties undermined their legitimacy for anyone claiming that “justice” had not been served. Wilson’s personality must bear some of the blame for this disillusionment. He was a proud man, confident of his objectivity and prestige, and he insisted on being the first U.S. president to sail to Europe and to conduct negotiations himself. He had visited Europe only twice before, as a tourist, and now delayed the peace conference in order to make a triumphant tour of European capitals. Moreover, the Democrats lost their Senate majority in the elections of November 1918, yet Wilson refused to include prominent Republicans in his delegation. This allowed Theodore Roosevelt to declare that Wilson had “absolutely no authority to speak for the American people.” Wilson’s flaws exacerbated the difficulty of promoting his ideals in Paris and at home. Still, he was a prophet in world politics, both as lawgiver and as seer. Only a peace between equals, he said, can last.