Tension and cooperation at the turn of the century
The 1990s revealed how difficult it would be to design a global structure of peace that was based on institutions and values shared by all the leading powers and capable of imposition upon the lesser ones. After the collapse of communism, some analysts had talked buoyantly of the triumph of capitalism and human rights, of the “end of history,” of a new world order. By the late 1990s, however, Russia was in such a dire condition—lawlessness and organized crime were rampant, in 1998 alone inflation was nearly 85 percent, Yeltsin fired two prime ministers, and the Duma launched impeachment proceedings against him—that analysts began to wonder if it would implode. The rosy scenarios gave way to suggestions that the world might soon be rent by a “clash of civilizations” pitting the democracies against militant Islam and an imperial China; by the spread of “chaos” as millions of refugees from the southern half of the world invaded the wealthy lands of the north; by ecological and demographic disasters touched off by the spread of industry and disease in the developing world; or by the spread of nuclear and missile technology into the hands of terrorists. These visions were perhaps overly pessimistic, but there were serious strains in the relationships of the great powers. Relations between the United States and Russia were often tense—especially because of Russia’s opposition to NATO’s use of force in the Balkans—and China’s dealings with the United States were likewise strained over Taiwan and China’s human-rights policies. The 1990s showed how vital it was for the world’s predominant powers to act together and with other countries to prevent conflict and to meet the many challenges facing the globe. At the very least, the leaders of the 21st century might derive hope from the fact that humanity survived the 20th century and acquire wisdom from its turbulent history.
(Read Britannica’s interview with Jimmy Carter on world affairs at the start of the 21st century.)