The Eastern front
The end of hostilities in western Europe also provoked a jockeying for position in eastern Europe, where Stalin’s fear of the all-conquering Nazis had grown apace. In 1940 Germany signed a pact with Romania for oil and arms transfers. Stalin then forced the Romanian government to hand over Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (June 26, 1940), and annexed Estonia, Latvia (July 12), and Lithuania (August 3) to the U.S.S.R. Hungary and Bulgaria now demanded Romanian territories for themselves, but Hitler intervened to prevent hostilities, lest Stalin see the chance to occupy the Romanian oil fields around Ploieşti. The Treaty of Craiova (August 21) awarded the Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and the so-called Vienna Award by Hitler and Mussolini ceded northern Transylvania to Hungary. Romania’s King Carol II abdicated in protest, General Ion Antonescu took power, and a German military mission arrived in Bucharest on October 12.
The Romanian coup provoked Mussolini’s next rash act. “Hitler always faces me with faits accomplis,” he raged. “This time I will pay him back in his own coin.” On October 13, Mussolini ordered Marshal Badoglio to prepare the long-desired attack on Greece for two weeks hence. He would declare his independence from Hitler and consummate his “parallel war.” On October 28, 1940, seven Italian divisions crossed the Albanian border into Greece, provoking Hitler’s adjutant to record: “Führer enraged…this is revenge for Norway and France.” In fact, Mussolini’s impetuous attack, combined with the reversals in Africa, would only ensure his humiliation and utter dependence on his northern ally. For the Greek campaign was predictably disastrous, given Italy’s bare numerical superiority and lack of planning and equipment, the rough terrain, and the determination of the Greeks. On November 8, General Alexandros Papagos counterattacked, and within a month the Greeks had turned the tables, occupying one-third of Albania. Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas refused to let the British into Greece for fear of provoking the Germans; indeed, he hoped to drive Italy out of the Balkans before German help might arrive, and to induce Yugoslavia and Turkey to make common cause with Greece against the Fascists.
The Balkan situation seriously interfered with Hitler’s evolving continental strategy. Ribbentrop still hoped to persuade him that Britain could be induced to relent through diplomacy, and his last achievement was the Tripartite (or Axis) Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan on September 27, 1940. Presumably, this alliance would deflect U.S. attention from Europe, threaten the U.S.S.R. with a war on two fronts, and thus drive the British to despair over the prospect of facing Germany alone. But London stood firm, and Hitler grew impatient to get on with his real chore of seizing a Ukrainian empire for the German master race. Upon his return from unsuccessful conferences with Franco at Hendaye (October 23) and Pétain at Montoire (24th), Hitler played host to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in Berlin (November 12–14). Though Stalin had meticulously observed his pact with Hitler, their rivalry in the Balkans strained relations. Hitler and Ribbentrop tried to persuade the Soviets to pursue their “natural tendency” to expand in the direction of the Indian Ocean, but Molotov repeatedly interrupted to ask the Germans why they were sending troops to Finland and Romania. These conversations confirmed Hitler’s intention to turn his idle military machine to the east. Conquest of the U.S.S.R. might serve now as both means and end, convincing the British of the hopelessness of their situation, allowing Hitler to realize Nazi racist fantasies, and forging a territorial basis for global empire. On December 18 he ordered the army to prepare Operation Barbarossa by May 15, 1941.
This latest timetable, however, fell victim to Mussolini’s folly and the need to secure Germany’s flank in the Balkans. German troops entered Romania on January 7, 1941, and Bulgaria on February 27. But Italy’s disasters brought into question the very survival of the Fascist regime. Mussolini made Badoglio a scapegoat and in November 1940 issued the first of his pitiful appeals to Hitler to bail him out. At their Berghof meeting on January 20, 1941, Hitler informed Mussolini of his plans to invade Greece. The death of Metaxas in the following days, in turn, led the Greeks to accept a British expeditionary force. Accordingly, Hitler pressured Yugoslavia to permit the passage of German troops, but air force officers in Belgrade staged a coup on March 27 and signed a treaty with Moscow. Furious over such defiance, Hitler ordered a Blitzkrieg for April 6 that broke Yugoslav resistance in five days and overran Greece by the 22nd. Crete then succumbed to a spectacular German airborne assault (May 20–31). Hitler set up puppet regimes in Serbia and “Greater Croatia” and partitioned the rest of Yugoslavia among his client states.
The Balkan campaign postponed “Barbarossa” for six weeks. This did not overly perturb Hitler, who promised his generals victory within a month and denied the need to prepare for cold-weather warfare in Russia. But some generals were skeptical of Blitzkrieg in the vastness of Russia, while others debated whether to force narrow spearheads deep into Russia, emulating the campaign in France, or fight classic battles of envelopment close to the frontier. Hitler’s “infallible intuition” dictated the latter, lest his armies, like Napoleon’s, be sucked too deep into Russia before enemy forces were destroyed. In the spring of 1941 the Wehrmacht assembled 4,000,000 men—the greatest invasion force in history—including 50 Finnish and Romanian and 207 German divisions armed with 3,300 tanks. They faced a Red Army of some 4,500,000 men and perhaps 15,000 tanks. German success depended heavily on surprise, but preparations of such magnitude could scarcely be hidden. Stalin seemed alive to the danger when he signed a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13 (knowing of Japan’s preference for a southern strategy from the espionage of Richard Sorge in Tokyo), then pleaded with Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke: “We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end.” Yet Stalin also redoubled his efforts to assure Hitler of his good intentions and discounted British warnings of a German attack (they had been making such predictions since June 1940, and even the British thought a German strike against Turkey or England more likely). Stalin may also have dismissed the warnings as attempts to poison his relations with Germany. In any case, the Germans achieved complete tactical surprise, while the Soviets’ forward deployments exposed them to the full force of Blitzkrieg.
The Germans struck on June 22, 1941, along a 2,000-mile-front. Three army groups drove deep into the Soviet Union, occupying vast territories and capturing huge numbers of Soviet troops. But gradually the momentum deserted the invaders. Many myths surround the 1941 campaign. It is said that the Germans were wrong in making for Moscow like Napoleon. But Moscow was of far more military value in 1941 than in 1812; it was the hub of Soviet railroads, communications, and government, and its capture might have crippled the Soviet effort to reinforce the front from the Asian hinterland or have undermined the Communist regime. It is also said that winter defeated the Germans. But they would have had ample time to reach Moscow before winter had they not wasted almost two months in diversions and debate. It is also said that the size of the Soviet Union made swift German victory impossible. But the endless Russian plain actually aided the panzer armies by giving them limitless room to maneuver and form the huge pockets that cost the Red Army 2,500,000 men in the first six months. What did stop the Germans was their own dilatoriness, the mud and unpaved roads, their underestimation of Soviet reserves and resilience, and the Nazis’ own brutality, which alienated a population otherwise hostile to Stalinism.
By December 1941 the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. and the latter’s survival had confirmed precisely that British hope which Hitler had meant to quash. The entry into the war of the United States that same month made German defeat virtually certain—and also brought to a close the last purely European war.
Origins of American belligerence
From neutrality to active aid
The outbreak of war brought a swift change of mood to the United States. While isolationism was still widespread, the vast majority of Americans were sympathetic to Britain, and Roosevelt did not follow Wilson in asking Americans to be neutral in thought as well as deed. Instead he set out to lead public opinion and gradually expand his ability to aid the Allies. On September 21, 1939, his brilliant speech to Congress laid the groundwork for passage of the Pittman Bill, which became law on November 4 and repealed the arms embargo on belligerent nations. Henceforth, the United States might trade with Britain and France, but only on a “cash and carry” basis. Senator Arthur Vandenberg rightly noted that the United States could not “become the arsenal for one belligerent without becoming the target for another.” Still, the President made clear to Churchill (with whom he struck up close relations by correspondence) his desire to aid Britain in every way consonant with the American mood. Only once did Roosevelt make a feint at mediation: In March 1940 he sent Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe on a fact-finding mission that revealed “scant immediate prospect” of peace. When Hitler’s Western offensive followed, even that dubious prospect disappeared, and Churchill assured his House of Commons that Britain would fight on “until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and liberation of the Old.”
In January 1940, Roosevelt asked for a mere $2,000,000,000 in defense spending, a slight increase over the year before. But the fall of France pushed the pace of U.S. rearmament up to $10,500,000,000 by September. Opinion polls showed the American public heavily favoring a policy of “all aid short of war” to Britain. On May 15, Churchill sought to capitalize on the shifting sentiment with an emergency request for 40 or 50 overage destroyers with which to counter German U-boats. Roosevelt hesitated because of the legal complications, while continuing his efforts to shape opinion by encouraging William Allen White’s Committee to Defend America to foster the idea that “Between Us and Hitler Stands the British Fleet!” On September 2 the United States transferred 50 warships to Britain in return for long-term leases on British naval bases in the Western Hemisphere. Despite Roosevelt’s public relations, isolationist sentiment remained strong. On September 4 the America First Committee arose to challenge Roosevelt’s deceptive campaign for intervention, and Wendell Willkie charged during the presidential campaign that Roosevelt’s reelection would surely mean war. The president responded that “your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars,” gliding over the fact that if the United States were attacked, it would no longer be a foreign war.
The next step in U.S. involvement stemmed from Churchill’s warning of December 9, 1940, that Britain was near bankruptcy. Roosevelt responded with lend-lease, a plan to “eliminate the dollar sign” by lending, not selling, arms. If your neighbor’s house is on fire, he argued, you do not sell him a hose, you lend it to him until the fire is out. “If Great Britain goes down,” he warned, “all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun…. We must be the great arsenal of democracy.” Churchill added his own ringing appeal on February 9, 1941: “Give us the tools and we will finish the job.” Willkie asked Republicans to back lend-lease, which became law on March 11.
Unknown to the public, Roosevelt authorized joint U.S.–British staff talks. The two countries also collaborated on how to meet the U-boat menace. Admiral Karl Dönitz’s wolfpack technique, by which eight to 10 U-boats would strike a convoy from the surface at night (thereby avoiding the British Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee device [ASDIC sonar]), cost the British and Americans 320,048 tons of shipping in January 1941 and 653,960 tons in April. American Admiral Harold R. Stark considered the situation “hopeless except as [the United States] take strong measures to save it.” In Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 (April 2) Roosevelt authorized the navy to attack German submarines west of 25° longitude and by executive agreement with the Danish government-in-exile placed Greenland under American protection (April 9). U.S. marines also occupied Iceland in July.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union posed the problem of whether to extend lend-lease to the U.S.S.R. Only 35 percent of Americans polled favored underwriting the Communist regime, but Roosevelt, supporting his acting secretary of state, Sumner Welles, said “Of course we are going to give all aid we possibly can to Russia,” on the theory that anything that contributed to the defeat of Germany enhanced the security of the United States. Aid to the Soviet Union began in July, and a formal agreement followed on August 2. But the initial supplies were too meagre to affect the battles of 1941. Roosevelt meanwhile pressed for amendments to the Selective Service Act to remove the ceiling of 900,000 men on U.S. armed forces and the ban on use of troops beyond the Western Hemisphere and to permit the president to retain draftees in service. This provoked the last great Congressional debate on isolationism versus interventionism; the House passed the bill by a single vote on August 12.
It was during this debate that Roosevelt and Churchill met secretly off the coast of Newfoundland and drafted a manifesto of the common principles that bound their two countries and all free peoples. In this eight-point Atlantic Charter (announced on August 14), reminiscent of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the signatories renounced territorial aggrandizement and endorsed the restoration of self-government to all captured nations and equal access to trade and raw materials for all. According to Churchill, Roosevelt also promised to “wage war but not declare it” and to look for an incident that would justify open hostilities. When the Congress voted on November 7 to arm merchant ships and allow them into the war zone, it seemed that submarine warfare would again be casus belli for the United States. U-boats had already torpedoed the destroyers Kearney and Reuben James (the latter was attacking the submarine, but sank with 115 hands on October 31). But in fact it took dramatic events in another theater altogether to make Roosevelt’s undeclared war official.
