On May 7 the German delegation was finally summoned to receive the draft treaty. Additional important clauses called for the abolition of the German high seas fleet, the general staff, and conscription; partition of Germany’s African colonies; cession of the Eupen-et-Malmédy district to Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine to France, most of Upper Silesia and West Prussia to Poland, including a corridor to the Baltic that cut Germany in two; plebiscites to determine whether Allenstein and Marienwerder should go to Poland and Schleswig to Denmark; a League of Nations administration for the free city of Danzig (to provide Poland a coastal port); prohibition of Anschluss (union) between Germany and Austria; and abrogation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Finally, Article 231 enjoined Germany to accept full responsibility for the war caused “by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”

The draft treaty caused acute consternation in Germany (though it left Germany intact and was mild compared to Germany’s terms to Russia at Brest-Litovsk), and the German delegation argued without success for substantial revisions. The Germans could not reject the treaty, however, without inviting a continuation of the Allied blockade, revolutionary outbreaks, an Allied military advance, or French intrigues against German unity. (On June 1, Foch’s generals in the occupation implicated themselves in an abortive separatist putsch aimed at creating a “Rhineland Republic” and thereby magnified German—and British—suspicions.) Hence, the German delegation—frock-coated professionals bearing little resemblance to the spike-helmeted militarists the Allies meant to punish—affixed their signatures to the treaty in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on the fifth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination (June 28, 1919). The Weimar coalition of Democrats, Social Democrats, and the Catholic Centre party ratified the treaty on July 9. German nationalists, however, denounced acceptance of the treaty as treason and immediately began propounding the myth that the German army had been “stabbed in the back” by Socialists and defeatists, the “November criminals” who signed the Armistice, and the liberal parties who signed the Versailles Diktat. The war-guilt clause was particularly damaging, since any historical evidence suggesting that Germany did not bear sole guilt for the war would tend to undermine the treaty’s legitimacy.

Allied delegates and populations were scarcely happier with the treaty than the Germans. British diplomat Harold Nicolson echoed the views of disillusioned Wilsonians when he left the signing ceremony in disgust, “and thence to bed, sick of life.” Economist John Maynard Keynes quit the peace conference in protest and returned to Britain to write a scathing critique of Wilson and the treaty, whose economic clauses, he said, stymied European recovery. Nor were the French satisfied. Marshal Foch despaired of containing the power of a united Germany and prophesied: “This is not peace, but a truce for 20 years.” Poincaré predicted willful German default and Allied disputes over execution. Clemenceau had to exploit all his prestige to win parliamentary ratification, and still he lost the presidential election that followed.

As for Wilson, the treaty he had personally helped to fashion, and the global obligations it imposed on the United States, proved unpopular with various factions in American politics, including nationalists, isolationists, “Monroe Doctrine” regionalists, xenophobes, and tariff protectionists. The immediate postwar years also gave rise to the “red scare,” the first legislation limiting immigration to the United States on an ethnic basis, and the belief that Wilson had been duped by the clever Europeans so that the war redounded only to the benefit of Anglo-French imperialism. But it is not true that the United States retreated at once into isolationism. The debate over Versailles was essentially a debate over the terms on which the United States would continue to play a role in world affairs. Most important was fear that Article 10 of the League Covenant might embroil the United States in foreign quarrels and even violate the Constitution. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, eventually proposed ratification of the Treaty of Versailles subject to 14 reservations, but Wilson insisted on an all-or-nothing strategy and embarked on a hectic national tour to mobilize public support. In October 1919 he suffered a debilitating stroke, and on November 19 the Senate voted down the treaty. Further compromise led to a final vote on March 19, 1920, but Wilson instructed his own loyalists to reject any reservations. The 49–35 vote fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority. By failing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the United States also rejected the League of Nations (which its own president had forced on the Europeans), the security guarantee by which Clemenceau had been persuaded to give up the Rhineland, and U.S. commitment to the economic and political reconstruction of Europe. All this gave those who clung to the belief that the French cause had been betrayed the opportunity to deal even more harshly with Germany.